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Abstract 
 
 Factors affecting cooperation are rarely studied in the context of the 1-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) game.  Many real-world interactions, however, are 1-time events, so it is 
important to determine how well factors studied in iterated games apply to the 1-shot PD. In the 
present within-subject study we systematically examine the interaction between 4 factors on 
cooperation in the PD that have only been studied haphazardly in the literature: symmetry, the 
number of negative (column) payoffs, the player’s relative position in asymmetric games, and 
social value orientation.  
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1 
Introduction 
 Social dilemmas arise when individuals must choose between actions that optimize their 
personal good or the good of the group; regardless of what others do, individuals are better off 
following their self-interest than acting in the collective interest (Krueger & Acevado, 2007).  
Formally, social dilemmas are characterized by two properties: (a) the social payoff to each 
individual for defecting behavior is higher than the payoff for cooperative behavior, regardless of 
what other society members do, yet (b) all individuals in the society receive a lower payoff if all 
defect than if all cooperate (Dawes, 1980).   
 For example, suppose you are a member of a team of students working on a project to 
which everyone is supposed to contribute and for which everyone will receive the same grade.  If 
you slack off and let others do the work, you can focus on other courses, where your grade 
depends solely on your own effort.  If everyone in the group followed the same reasoning, 
however, the group project would not get done and you would fail along with the others in your 
group.  In this case, contributing is the individual’s cooperative solution and free riding is the 
individual’s defection solution. 
 To study the logic of social dilemmas, stripped of their real-world complexity, social 
scientists have invented a variety of games (Kollock, 1998).  In order to control for emotions, 
values, and norms that human participants carry with them, experimental games often have a 
human decision maker (DM) unknowingly play the game with a computer (PC) with a pre-
programmed strategy.  These studies help researchers understand the underlying logic of the 
dilemmas and develop hypotheses about real-life conditions that would tip the balance toward or 
away from cooperation. 
 The most commonly studied social-dilemma games are two person games called 
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prisoner’s dilemma games (PDs).  The name arises from a historical hypothetical dilemma in 
which each of two prisoners must choose between remaining silent and confessing.  If both 
remain silent, both will get a short prison sentence based on other chargers.  If both confess, they 
will both get a moderately long sentence.  If only one confesses, that one will be granted 
immunity and gets no sentence but the partner will get a long sentence.  They can neither 
communicate, nor learn the other’s choice until both have chosen.   
 When played in the psychology lab, the game’s stakes are changed from prison time to 
monetary rewards or losses.  On each trial, each player can choose an action - cooperate for the 
common good or to defect from the common good.  Neither player learns the other’s choice until 
both have responded, and the payoff to each player depends on the combination of their two 
actions.  The payoff matrix has the following characteristics: (a) the highest individual payoff 
goes to the player who defects while the other cooperates (Temptation, T); (b) the lowest 
individual payoff goes to the player who cooperates while the other defects (Sucker, S); (c) the 
highest total payoff to the two players combined occurs if both cooperate (Reward, R); and (d) 
the lowest total payoff occurs if they both defect (Punishment, P).  These four values and their 
relationship are represented as a matrix in Figure 1. 
 The game is a social dilemma because the highest individual payoff to either player 
comes from defecting, but the highest total payoff to the two combined comes from cooperating.  
If the other player defects, one gets more for defecting than for cooperating; if the other 
cooperates, one still gets more for defecting than for cooperating; but if both defect, each gets 
less than they would have if both had cooperated.  
 Since a DM who always defects will necessarily win more money than one who always 
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cooperates, logic compels both players to defect and they usually do - despite the higher payoff 
they would have received if they had cooperated.  
 The goal of the present study is to improve our understanding of the psychological 
processes involved in social dilemmas and situational judgments by manipulating factors that 
may tip the balance toward or away from cooperation.  The following section reviews some of 
these factors. 
Previous literature 
 In the one-trial (1-shot) version of the game, each player plays only once with another 
player. In the iterated PD, two players play the same game repeatedly with each other for a series 
of trials.  In both cases the players are anonymous and cannot communicate and coordinate their 
choices. 
Asymmetry and Relative Position 
 Almost all studies investigating the PD use identical payoffs for both players (symmetric 
payoffs), but many real-world interactions involve different outcomes for the two players, even 
in cases of joint cooperation and joint defection (Beckenkamp, Hennig-Shmidt, & Maier-Rigaud, 
2007). For example, regardless of the players’ joint choices in Figure 2’s asymmetric matrix, 
Participant B’s payoffs for each outcome (R, S, T, or P) will always be x units lower than the 
payoffs for the same actions for Participant A.  There is little literature on asymmetric PDs, with 
substantial differences in the number of asymmetric payoffs, the methods by which symmetric 
games were transformed, and the magnitude of the transformation.  When asymmetric games are 
studied, asymmetry is seldom treated as a factor in its own right, with direct comparisons 
possible between corresponding symmetric and asymmetric games.  We are unaware of any 
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within-subject studies where subjects played both a symmetric and a matching asymmetric game. 
 Introducing asymmetry into the PD also creates a distinction between the two players, 
now called the High and the Low player, with the payoffs of the High player always being 
greater than, or equal to, the payoffs of the Low player1. Cooperation rates are typically lower 
for the Low player, leading to overall lower cooperation in the asymmetric game than in t
symmetric one.  
 For example, Schellenberg (1964) studied the effects of asymmetry on cooperation in 
prisoner dilemma games with strictly positive matrices.  In Experiment 1, participants played the 
same game (either symmetric or asymmetric) 20 times with feedback against a live stooge with 
predetermined response patterns.  While overall cooperation rates were the same in the 
symmetric (32%) and asymmetric games (33%), participants in the asymmetric game who were 
assigned to the higher payoff condition cooperated significantly more often (43.5%) than those 
assigned to the lower payoff condition (22.5%), across all conditions. 
 These results were not replicated in Experiment 2, where the games were played with 
participant-pairs rather than an experimenter stooge. There was no significant difference between 
cooperation rates in the symmetric and asymmetric games and no significant difference in the 
cooperation rate between the two players in the asymmetric game. Schellenberg attributes this 
discrepancy to the low cooperation rates of the chosen games in general and the low cooperation 
rates of the players with lower payoffs driving down the cooperation rates of those with higher 
payoffs.   
 Lave (1965) had an asymmetric treatment (DMs were exclusively human) which 
modified the symmetric game by multiplying the payoffs of one of the players by 2.5 in case of 
 
1 A non-linear transformation could produce an asymmetric matrix where payoff dominance is not so clear. 
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mutual cooperation.  Lave found a decline of cooperation from 57.5% to 50% compared with the 
symmetric treatment. 
 Cooperation rates may have also been depressed by the lack of tangible outcomes for 
choices, i.e., the experiment was solely for course credit.  It has been found that in the PD and 
other dilemma games (e.g., Gallo & McClintock, 1965; McClintock & McNeal, 1966) that 
participants cooperate more when real money is at stake, compared to imaginary outcomes. 
Radlow (1965), using a random-trial reward technique, also found that cooperation increased as 
the matrix values more closely approximated the actual payoffs.   
Negative payoffs 
 Another intermittently studied factor affecting cooperation is the sign of the payoff.  As 
many researchers study social dilemmas from a gain-loss perspective, they have focused on the 
comparison of all positive to all negative payoffs matrices and in a few cases on mixed matrices 
with two positive and two negative payoffs. The findings on the effects of sign are highly 
equivocal, with no consistent effects (or lack thereof). Interestingly, unbalanced matrices e.g., 3 
positive / 1 negative payoff, or vice versa, are never considered.   
 Lave (1965) ran a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with several symmetric treatments 
which always offered fixed positive payoffs for mutual cooperation (R) and fixed negative 
payoffs for mutual defection (P).  The treatments varied in either 1) the severity of the negative 
payoff for the sucker’s bet (S), i.e., cooperating when one’s partner (sometimes a PC) defected, 
or 2) the temptingness (T) of the positive payoff should one double-cross the partner, i.e., defect 
when he/she cooperates.   Not surprisingly, Lave found that when other factors were held 
constant, cooperation rates improved as the severity of S decreased, and declined as T increased. 
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 Jones, Steele, Gahagan, and Tedeschi (1968) studied cooperation in the symmetric PD by 
examining two factors: the absolute magnitude of the payoff values (10s, 100s, and 1000s) and 
(R-P)/(T-S), the ratio of the differences among the 4 matrix payoffs (.1, .5, or .9).  There is 
roughly a linear relationship between the (R-P)/(T-S) index and cooperation rate – people 
cooperate more when playing games with a higher index value.  Of particular interest to the 
present study, was that the 10s magnitude level contained mixed positive and negative payoffs, 
with R and T always positive and S and T always negative (2 positive, 2 negative payoffs), while 
the other magnitude levels had all positive payoffs.  Cooperation was significantly higher for 
matrices with mixed payoffs than for the all-positive matrices.  It was also found that presence of 
negative payoffs led to more cooperative behavior as the ratio increases in value, as compared 
with those matrices where all the payoffs were positive.   Unfortunately, the findings are 
hindered by the confounding of negative payoffs and magnitude. 
Asymmetry, Relative Position and Sign 
 Only one study (Sheposh & Gallo, 1973) has compared choice behavior in the symmetric 
and asymmetric PD with the two other factors introduced earlier: 1) the sign of the payoffs (in 
their study, all positive values or 2 positive and 2 negative values), and 2) the strength of the 
DM’s position (lower or higher potential payoff in the asymmetric game).  The study used a 
between-subject design. 
 Like Schellenberg (1964, Experiment 1) and Lave (1965),  Sheposh and Gallo found a 
main effect for asymmetry, with the asymmetric condition producing significantly less 
cooperation (31.11%) than the symmetric condition (39.18%).  Also similar to Schellenberg’s 
experiment with predetermined stooge responses, (a) symmetry interacted with player position, 
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with row-players as likely to cooperate as column-players (39.76% vs. 38.6%) in the symmetric 
game, but low-players significantly less likely to cooperate than high-players (25.11% vs. 
37.1%) in the asymmetric game.  They found no interaction between symmetry and the sign of 
the payoff, nor any main effect of the sign of the payoff.  
 In interpreting their findings, the authors examined the DM’s conditional probability of 
defecting given the other player’s previous decisions.  They found that whereas the DM was 
significantly less likely to defect following cooperative action than after a defection in the 
symmetric game, the low-player’s defection rate in the asymmetric game was independent of the 
other player’s previous choice.  They tentatively inferred from this pattern that concern with 
relative outcomes, particularly with being surpassed by the other player, rather than maximizing 
one’s own outcomes, was the primary motivator for low-players’ low cooperation in the 
asymmetric game.  Individual differences in weighing own- and other-outcomes would be taken 
up by research in social value orientation.  
Social Value Orientation 
 Another factor which may affect cooperative behavior is social value orientation (SVO), 
a preference for a particular pattern of self-other outcome distributions.  According to 
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), social motives induce a transformation of a 
given social dilemma into an “effective matrix” where both one’s own outcome and the other’s 
outcomes are accorded subjective weight (Ws and Wo respectively, with -1 ≤ Ws and Wo ≤ 1), 
and the weighted outcomes are summed.  A three-category typology of motives has been 
empirically supported (Deutsch, 1960): cooperation, individualism, and competition.  For those 
with a cooperative motive (pro-socials), the weights are equal and positive (Ws = Wo = 1); for 
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individualists, the self is weighted positively, but the other is ignored (Ws = 1 and Wo = 0); and 
for competitors, the self is weighted positively and the other is weighted negatively (Ws = 1 and 
Wo = -1).   In all cases, the individual chooses the strategy that yields the highest value by their 
effective matrix.   
 De Dreu and McCusker (1997) examined the effects of gain-loss framing (as a between-
subject factor) on cooperation in the 1-shot (non-iterated) symmetric PD. A gain frame is 
equivalent to all-positive payoffs and a loss frame to all-negative payoffs.  In experiment 1, 
social-value orientation was used as post-hoc blocking factor for the framing manipulation, and 
in experiments 2 and 3, social motive was directly manipulated via the instructions as an 
additional between-subjects factor.  No main effect was found for gain-loss framing (there was 
no significant difference between the all-positive and all-negative conditions) in either 
experiment. However, there was a significant interaction between outcome frame and social 
motive - whether assessed post-hoc or directly manipulated - whereby pro-socials cooperated 
significantly more often in the loss frames (all-negative payoffs) than they did in gain frames 
(all-positive payoffs).  The opposite pattern was found for individualists, who cooperated 
significantly less often in the loss frames than they did in gain frames.  Framing had no effects 
on competitors (possibly due to floor effects).  There was also a main effect of social motive, 
with pro-socials cooperating significantly more often than individualists or competitors. 
 De Dreu and McCusker suggest that discrepancies in the effect (or lack thereof) of the 
sign of the payoff may partly be explained by inadvertent manipulation of social motive in the 
instructions to participants.   They classified 18 previous (peer-reviewed, psychology-journal) 
research articles according to their frames (all-positive or all-negative payoffs) and found that 
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when frame did not affect cooperation, the instructions had been neutral; when the loss frame 
reduced cooperation, the instructions were primarily individualistic; and when the loss frame 
reduced cooperation, instructions were primarily pro-social.  However, in both Sheposh’s and 
Gallo’s (1973) and Jones et al.’s (1968) studies (which they did not include), the instructions to 
participants were neutral and pre-play contact was minimized. 
Overview of the present study 
 Factors affecting cooperation are rarely studied in the context of the 1-shot PD game.  
Instead, most studies have their subjects play a single experimental condition iterated multiple 
times and use the number of cooperative choices as the dependent variable.  Many real-world 
interactions, however, are 1-time events, so it is important to determine how those factors apply 
to the 1-shot PD.    In the present study we systematically study the interaction between 4 factors 
on cooperation in the PD: symmetry/asymmetry between the payers’ payoffs, the number of 
negative payoffs of the column player, the player’s relative position, and the actor’s SVO. 
Hypotheses 
SVO. Players with a cooperative SVO should cooperate significantly more often than players 
with an individualist or competitive SVO.  SVO will interact with (a)symmetry and relative 
position as detailed below. 
Negative payoffs.  We hypothesize that the equivocal effects shown in the literature were due to 
the demand characteristics of previous studies and expect to find neither a main effect of the 
number of negative payoffs nor any interaction with any other factor.  
Symmetry and Position. We expect to find an interaction between symmetry and position: In 
symmetric games, there will be no consistent difference in cooperation rate when a subject plays 
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in the row position or the column position; in asymmetric games, subject should cooperate 
significantly more often when playing in the higher position then when playing in the lower 
position. 
Asymmetry and Position and SVO. Asymmetry is created by holding the row position payoffs 
constant and varying the payoffs of the column player. We distinguish between two types of 
asymmetric games: In RowPositve games the row player always receives the highest payoffs 
available (all positive) and in RowNegative games the row player always receives the lowest 
payoffs available (all negative).  We expect that subjects will cooperate significantly more in the 
RowPositive games than in the RowNegative games when they enjoy the higher relative 
position, but that their cooperation rate will not differ between the RowPositive and 
RowNegative games when they are in the lower relative position.  This interaction should be 
moderated by SVO, with the difference in cooperation between the RowPositive and 
RowNegative games being largest for those with a cooperative SVO when playing in the higher 
relative position but larger for those with a competitive SVO when playing in the lower relative 
position.    
Decision Time.  In addition to studying cooperation rate across conditions, we also examine 
decision time as a proxy for cognitive complexity.  The introduction of asymmetry and negative 
payoffs should make games more difficult to evaluate.  Particularly, decision times should 
increase as the number of negative payoffs increase and RowNegative asymmetric games should 
take longer to respond to than RowPositive or symmetric games. 
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Methods 
Design  
 We examined the effects of three within-subject factors on the odds of players 
cooperating in the PD:  symmetry/asymmetry between the players, the number of negative 
payoffs of the column player, and the player’s relative position.   
 To investigate these factors we designed 13 PD games which systematically varied 
symmetry, the number of negative payoffs, and the player’s relative position (see Table 1 for all 
13 distinct combinations of the three factors). The (R-P)/(T-S) index (Rapoport & Chammah, 
1965), a predictor of cooperative play in the PD based on the ratio of the differences of payoff 
values of all the games was 0.5. See Figures 1 and 2 for an explanation of the RSTP labels in the 
context of a symmetric PD and an asymmetric PD, respectively. All games were produced 
through linear transformations of the payoffs of the Row and / or the Column players.  See 
Appendix A for the derivation of the game matrices and a listing of the 13 games played.  
 The games can be described in terms of the following factors: 
(1) Symmetry had 3 levels: Symmetric, Asymmetric: RowPositive, and Asymmetric: 
RowNegative;  
(2) The number of negative column payoffs ranged from 0 to 4, i.e., from all-positive to all-
negative; the sign of row payoffs decreased systematically in Games 1-5, was always positive in 
Games 6-9 and was always negative in Games 10-13; 
(3) Relative to the column player, the row player’s payoff’s were equal (Games 1-5), higher 
(Games 6-9) or lower (Games 10-13)  
 The experiment followed a within-subject design, with participants playing all 13 PDs.  
The games were presented in random order, and for each game subjects were randomly assigned 
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as the row or the column player (High or Low position in asymmetric games).  Participants were 
told that each 1-shot game was being played with another (randomly selected) participant whose 
identity and choices were to remain anonymous (No feedback).  In fact, players were not 
matched - we were interested in their individual pattern of responses across the 13 matrices. 
 Additionally, prior to playing the PDs, participants’ Social Value Orientation (SVO) was 
assessed by a 24-item paper-and-pencil version of Liebrand’s RING measure (Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988).  Participants made 24 choices between two own/other outcome allocations, 
with each pair of outcomes  sampled from the circumference of a circle in the own/other 
outcome plane consisting of outcomes to self on the horizontal axis, and outcomes to other on 
the vertical axis.  Specific own/other outcomes are defined as points in this two dimensional 
plane, with the center of the $15.00 radius circle coinciding with the origin of the plane and 
denoting $.00 for self and $.00 for other.  
 Each pair consisted of two sampled own/other outcome allocations.  For example, 
participants had to choose between either A: $14.50 for me, and -$3.90 for other, or B: $13.00 
for me and -$7.00 for other. For each of the 24 pairs of outcomes, subjects were instructed to 
choose the outcome distribution they most preferred. Adding up the chosen amounts separately 
for self and for other provides an estimate of the weights assigned by the subject to own and 
other's payoffs. These weights are used to estimate the direction of the subject's value vector 
extending from the origin of the own/other outcome plane. All vectors with angles between 
112.5 and 67.5 (North = 90; East = 0) degrees were classified as altruistic; those between 67.5 
and 22.5 degrees as cooperative; those between 22.5 and 337.5 degrees as individualistic; and 
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those between 337.5 and 292.5 degrees as competitive. See Figure 3 for a plane with these 
regions identified. 
 The length of a value vector provides a measure of the consistency of participants’ 
choices in this linear choice model, with random choices resulting in an expected vector length 
of zero. The maximum vector length is twice the radius of the circle, so dividing the length by 30 
gives a reliability index from 0 to 1. The observed mean reliability was .85 (SD = .17).  
Participants 
 The participants were 294 (155 UIUC and 139 NWU) undergraduate students recruited 
via advertisements on campus bulletin boards and web sites on a first-come-first-serve basis. The 
UIUC sample had a mean age of 20.70 (SD = 2.46) and consisted of 48 males and 107 females; 
The NWU sample had a mean age of 19.76 (SD = 2.07) and consisted of 56 males and 83 
females.  The UIUC pool was primarily psychology majors and NWU pool was primarily 
business majors.  Participants were compensated 5-13 dollars for their time (30-60 minutes), 
with the payment corresponding to their cooperation/defection decisions (in conjunction with 
hidden, randomly chosen responses from the PC) on a subset of the 13 matrices. 
Procedures 
 The experiment was conducted online (http://labdb6.psych.uiuc.edu/) but all subjects 
were run in the lab. At least four participants completed the experiment simultaneously to 
maintain the illusion that each game was being played with another random-selected participant 
rather than the PC.  Following completion of the SVO questionnaire (only the last 121 
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participants)2, they were logged onto privately-enclosed lab PCs and completed 4 practice 
matrices to familiarize themselves with the task.  They then completed all 13 games (20 minutes) 
believing they were playing each game against another anonymous participant.  Both game order 
and player position (row or column) within each matrix was randomly assigned.  
 In the second part of the experiment (not analyzed here), participants played one of the 
games (randomly selected) 30 times in a fixed role (row or column) against the same opponent, 
with feedback provided on the other player’s decisions after every round.  The subjects believed 
they were playing against another anonymous participant, but “the other” was actually the PC 
with a pre-programmed strategy.  After completing all the games, participants answered a final 
short questionnaire, mostly assessing their empathy / inter-personal reactivity with the other 
player [in the 30 trial game] (not analyzed here).  Then they were debriefed, paid, and dismissed.  
 
2 The data were collected in two waves, with 94 UIUC and 79 NWU subjects participating in the first wave, and 61 
UIUC and 60 NWU in the second.  Only those who participated in the second wave completed the SVO 
questionnaire. 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 provides the cooperation rate (proportion of subjects choosing the cooperative 
action) by game.  Games are categorized by their symmetry and the number of negative column 
payoffs.  For symmetric games, cooperation rates are given separately for when participants 
played in the row and column positions.   Row and Column payoffs are always matched and both 
decrease equally as the number of negative payoffs increase.  In the asymmetric games, 
cooperation rates are given separately for when players had the higher relative payoff (High) and 
when they had the lower relative payoff (Low).  Asymmetric games are further subdivided into 
RowPositive, where the row player’s payoffs were always the maximum available (and all 
positive), and RowNegative, where the row player’s payoffs were always the minimum (and all 
negative); only the column payoffs decrease as the number of negative payoffs increase.  The 
dashes in the asymmetric blocks denote invalid combinations – conditions where the games 
would be symmetric instead of asymmetric.  The final column in Table 2, Joint, gives the 
probability that players in both positions will cooperate in a given game.  
 Of the 121 participants administered the SVO, 37 were Cooperative, 64 were 
Individualist, and 19 were Competitive.  There were no altruists and 1 ‘sadist’ (ignore own 
payoffs, harm others).  The distribution of SVO did not differ by sex, χ2 (2) = .13, p = .94, but 
did differ by school, χ2 (2) = 68.77, p < .001 (see Table 3). 
Inferential Statistics 
 Cooperation rate and decision times were examined (a) across all games, (b) for 
symmetric games only, and (c) for asymmetric games only.   Analyzing the data across all 
conditions allowed for finer distinctions within factors such as 3 levels of symmetry 
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(RowPositive, Symmetric, and RowNegative) and 3 levels of position (High, Matched, and 
Low), but made interactions more difficult to interpret given the unbalanced experimental 
design.  By reanalyzing the data using only symmetric games, we could focus on the interaction 
between the number of negative payoffs and SVO in a comparable manner to previous research. 
In turn, by reanalyzing the data using only asymmetric games, we were better able to disentangle 
the interaction between Asymmetry, Position, and SVO.  See Figure 4 for the cumulative 
distributions of the number of cooperative decisions (0-5 for symmetric games, 0-8 for 
asymmetric games, and 0-13 for all games).  
 In addition to partitioning the games in three different ways, the analysis of cooperation 
rate and decision time was conducted for four different methods of sub-setting the sample: 
1) Include all subjects (N = 294); 
2) Include only subjects with measured SVO (N = 120); 
3) Include only subjects who did not defect (or cooperate) across all 13 games (N = 194); 
4) Include only subjects with measured SVO who did not defect (or cooperate) across all 13 
games (N = 83). 
SVO was only measured in the second wave of data collection, so the full sample could not be 
used when analyzing its main effect or interactions.  The data were reanalyzed without persistent 
cooperators or defectors because subjects who responded the same way across all conditions may 
not have seriously attended to any of the experimental factors, masking differences across 
conditions. 
Table 4 summarizes the results (s / ns / na) across factors and analyses. 
All Games 
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Full Sample 
 Cooperation rate. Given the binary outcome variable (cooperate or defect) and the 
unbalanced repeated measures design, the data were analyzed with SAS’s GENMOD function 
(SAS 9.1.3) with a logit linking function and an exchangeable covariance structure, r = .34 (an 
unstructured approach did not improve fit).  In addition to the three factors manipulated 
(symmetry, position, negative payoffs), the participants’ sex and school (UIUC psychology and 
NWU business) were included as blocking variables, and age as a covariate.  For the 2- and 3-
way models, the interaction between symmetry (Symmetric, RowPositive, RowNegative) and 
position (High, Neutral, Low) was analyzed via an indicator variable containing the 5 valid 
combinations: Symmetric & Neutral (M = .26); RowPositive & High (M = .31); RowPositive & 
Low (M = .21); RowNegative & High (M = .24); RowNegative & Low (M = .19).   The 2-way 
model’s deviance (4135) did not differ dramatically from that of the 3-way (4125), so only the 
symmetry by position interaction was included.   
 Table 5 contains the score χ2 tests of the model effects on cooperation rate:  Both the 
blocking variable School (χ2 (1) = 17.25) and the interaction between Symmetry and Position (χ2 
(4) = 14.70) were significant, p < .0001.  Table 6 examines the parameter estimates and odds-
ratios for each effect: Students at UIUC (predominantly psychology majors) were 2.17 times 
more likely than students at NWU (predominantly business majors) to cooperate in the PD 
games; compared to when playing in RowNegative & Low games, participants were 1.95 times 
more likely to cooperate when they played in RowPositive & High games (p < .001), 1.51 in 
Symmetric & Neutral games(p < .001), 1.35 in RowNegative & High games (p = .04), and 1.08 
in RowPositive & Low games  (not significant, p = .61).  The interaction is primarily explained 
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by participants cooperating significantly more often in the RowPositve & High games than in 
any of the others, χ2 (1) = 16.1, p < .0001.  There was a main effect of symmetry, with 
participants cooperating significantly more often when playing in RowPositve (χ2 (1) = 4.95, p = 
.03) and Symmetric (χ2 (1) = 9.31, p = .002) games than when playing in RowNegative games.  
There was also a main effect of position, with participants cooperating significantly more often 
when playing in the High (χ2 (1) = 14.57, p = .0001) and Neutral (χ2 (1) = 14.75, p = .0001) 
positions than when playing in the Low position. 
 Decision Time. Decision times were treated as normally distributed and also analyzed in 
Genmod with an exchangeable covariance structure (r = .44); fit was neither improved by 
treating decision times as gamma distributed with an inverse linking function nor by treating 
covariance as unstructured.  The 2-way model’s deviance (3818) did not differ from that of the 
3-way, so only the symmetry by position interaction was included.       
 Table 7 contains the score χ2 tests of the model effects on decision times: Both the 
blocking variable Sex (χ2(1) = 8.53), the factor Negative Payoffs (χ2 = 23.09) and the interaction 
between Symmetry and Position (χ2 (4) = 14.70) were significant, p < .0001.  In turn, Table 8 
examines the parameter estimates and mean decision times for each effect: Males took 
significantly longer to respond than females (M = 18.98 sec. vs. 15.54 sec.); decision times were 
significantly faster when players had 0 (M = 15.95 sec.) or 1 (M = 16.14) negative payoffs than 
when they had 2 (M = 17.68), 3 (M = 17.94) or 4 (M = 18.60) negative payoffs (the contrast 
between 1 and 2 was significant, χ2 (1) = 13.49, p = .0002, so the others were as well).  For the 
symmetry by position interaction, decision time were significantly slower in RowNegative & 
Low games than in any of the other games, χ2 = 22.83, p < .0001.  There was a main effect for 
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symmetry, with decision times significantly slower in RowNegative games (M = 17.76) than in 
RowPositive (M = 16.09, χ2 (1) = 30.29) or Symmetric games (M = 16.30, χ2 (1) = 18.03), p < 
.0001.  There was also a main effect of position, with decision times significantly slower when 
playing in the Low position than when playing in the Neutral position (M = 17.03 sec. vs. 16.30 
sec.), χ2 (1) = 5.08, p = .02. 
SVO Added as a Within-subjects Factor 
 Cooperation rate. The analyses were repeated (N reduced from 294 to 120) with SVO 
included as a within-subjects factor and the measure of the SVO’s reliability included as a 
covariate.  The deviance for the model with a 2-way interaction between symmetry and position 
(1616) was not significantly worse than the model with a 3-way interaction between symmetry, 
position, and SVO (1596), χ2 (16) = 20, p = .22, so SVO was only included as a main effect.  
 Once again, only School (χ2 (1) = 9.02, p = .003) and the Symmetry by Position 
interaction (χ2 (4) = 15.07, p = .003) were significant, with SVO (χ2 (2) = 4. 21) at p = .12.  In 
terms of the odds, those with a cooperative SVO were 2.16 times more likely to cooperate than 
those with a competitive SVO (p = .08) and 1.74 times more likely to cooperate than those with 
an individualist SVO (p = .06), but neither comparison was significant at p < .05.   
 Decision time. SVO was again not a significant predictor, χ2 (2) = 4.70, p = .10; mean 
decision time for those with a cooperative SVO (M = 19.21) was significantly (p = .03) slower 
than those with a competitive SVO (M = 14.99) but did not differ significantly (p = .08) from 
those with an individualist SVO (M = 16.40).  
Persistent Cooperators and Defectors Excluded 
 Cooperation rate. The analyses of cooperation rate and decision time were also rerun 
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excluding those subjects who had defected across all 13 games (n = 98) and those who had 
cooperated across all 13 games (n = 2), leaving 194 subjects.  The 2-way model still provided the 
best fit.  For cooperation rate, the symmetry by position interaction remained significant (χ2 (4) = 
24.09, p < .0001); removing persistent defectors, however, eliminated the effect of the blocking 
variable School on cooperation rate, χ2 (1)= .76, p = .38.  Of the 98 persistent defectors, 65 were 
from NWU, i.e., the “business major” sample; thus, 65/139 = .47 of the NWU sample were 
persistent defectors (as were 33/155 = .21 of the UIUC sample). 
 Decision time. In predicting decision times with persistent defectors removed, both the 
blocking variable Sex (χ2 (1) = 6.34, p = .01), the factor Negative Payoffs (χ2 (4) = 22.15, p = 
.0002) and the interaction between Symmetry and Position (χ2 (4) = 21.56, p = .0002) remained 
significant.  Males took significantly longer to respond (M = 19.78 sec.) than females (M = 
15.96).  Decision times were significantly faster in games with 0 (M = 16.65 sec.) or 1 (M = 
16.59) negative payoffs than in games with 2 (M = 18.08), 3 (M = 18.45), or 4 (M = 19.59), χ2 
(1) = 19.95, p < .0001.  Decision times were significantly faster in the Symmetric & Neutral (M 
= 17.32 sec.), RowPositive & High (M = 17.07) and RowPositive & Low (M = 16.57) games 
than in the RowNegative & High (M = 18.45); RowNegative & Low (M = 19.95) games, χ2 (1) = 
18.59, p < .0001.  
SVO Added and Persistent Cooperators/Defectors Excluded 
 Cooperation rate. With SVO included as a within-subjects factor, its reliability included 
as a covariate, and the persistent cooperators and defectors excluded, the sample size was 
reduced to 83.  As always, the symmetry by position interaction was a significant predictor of 
cooperation, χ2 (4) = 15.40, p = .004, with players 2.11 times more likely to cooperate when 
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playing Symmetric & Neutral games (p = .0009) and 2.74 times more likely to cooperate when 
playing RowPositive & High games (p = .0007) than when playing in the Low position of either 
RowPositive or RowNegative games. SVO did not significantly predict cooperation (χ2 (2) = 
5.50, p = .06).  In terms of the odds, cooperators were 1.97 times more likely to cooperate than 
competitors (p = .08) and 1.88 times more likely to cooperate than individualists (p = .02), but 
only the cooperative vs. individualist comparison was significant at p < .05.   
 Decision time. In predicting decision time, only the number of negative payoffs was 
significant, χ2 (4) = 13.90, p = .008.  Mean decision time was significantly faster with 0 (M = 
16.51 sec.) or 1 (M = 16.23) negative payoffs than with 2 (M = 17.84), 3 (M = 18.48), or 4 (M = 
20.28) negative payoffs, χ2 (1) = 9.95, p = .002. 
Symmetric Games Only 
Full Sample 
 Cooperation rate. In examining only the symmetric games (N = 294), the effects tested 
were the blocking variables school and sex, the covariate age, and the factor the number of 
negative payoffs to the column player.  Under this model, school (χ2 (1) = 10.41, p = .001), sex 
(χ2 (1) = 3.90, p = .05), and negative payoffs (χ2 (4) = 9.55, p = .05) were significant predictors of 
cooperation.  UIUC students were 1.96 times more likely to cooperate than NWU students and 
males were 1.52 times more likely to cooperate than females.  Players were more 1.33 times 
more likely to cooperate in games where all payoffs were positive (0 negative payoffs) than in 
games with 1 negative payoff (p = .05) and 1.52 more likely than in games with 3 negative 
payoffs (p = .003).  See Figure 6 for cooperation rate across negative payoffs. 
 Decision time. Both the covariate Sex (χ2 (1) = 9.25, p = .002) and the factor Number of 
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Negative Payoffs (χ2 (4) = 41.63, p < .0001) were significant predictors of decision time.  Males 
took significantly longer to respond than females, M = 18.87 vs. 14.82 sec.  Mean decision time 
was significantly faster with 0 (M = 14.80 sec.) or 1 (M = 15.04) negative payoffs than with 2 (M 
= 18.13), 3 (M = 17.80), or 4 (M = 18.46) negative payoffs, χ2 (1) = 41.45, p < .0001.  
SVO added as a within-subjects factor 
 Cooperation rate. Table 9 and Figure 5 give the cooperation rate when the number of 
negative payoffs is crossed with SVO (N = 120).  Neither the interaction between the number of 
negative payoffs and SVO (χ2 (8) = 7.30, p = .50) nor the effects of negative payoffs (χ2 (4) = 
1.63, p = .80) or SVO (χ2 (2) = 5.90, p = .06) were significant.  School was significant (χ2 (1) = 
4.28, p = .04), with UIUC students 1.96 times more likely to cooperate than NWU students. 
 Decision time. In predicting decision time, only the number of negative payoffs was 
significant, χ2 (4) = 20.72, p = .0004.  Mean decision time was significantly faster with 0 (M = 
14.30 sec.) or 1 (M = 14.11) negative payoffs than with 2 (M = 17.73), 3 (M = 17.75), or 4 (M = 
18.95) negative payoffs, χ2 (1) = 19.44, p = .0001. 
Persistent Cooperators and Defectors excluded 
 Cooperation rate. With persistent cooperators and defectors excluded (N = 194), only the 
number of negative payoffs remained significant, χ2 (4) = 9.55, p = .05.  Players likelihood to 
cooperate with 3 negative payoffs was .60 that of their likelihood to cooperate with 2 (p = .05) 
and .57 that of their likelihood to cooperate with 4 (p = .03) negative payoffs. 
 Decision time. Only the number of negative payoffs was significant, χ2 (4) = 15.01, p = 
.005.  Mean decision time was significantly faster with 0 (M = 15.68 sec.), 1 (M = 16.39) or 2 (M 
= 17.75) negative payoffs than with 3 (M = 19.17) or 4 (M = 19.96) negative payoffs, χ2 (1) = 
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13.68, p = .0002. 
SVO Added and Persistent Cooperators/Defectors Excluded 
 Cooperation rate. With SVO included as a within-subjects factor, its reliability included 
as a covariate, and the persistent cooperators and defectors excluded (N = 83), no effects were 
significant at p < .05. 
 Decision time. Both SVO (χ 2 (2) = 6.93, p = .03) and the number of negative payoffs (χ2 
(4) = 10.87, p = .03 were significant.  For SVO, cooperators (M = 23.84 sec.) took significantly 
longer to respond than either competitors (M = 13.44, p = .002) or individualists (M = 17.48, p = 
.04).  For negative payoffs, mean decision time was significantly faster with 0 (M = 15.57 sec.), 
1 (M = 15.49) or 2 (M = 17.96) negative payoffs than with 3 (M = 20.71) or 4 (M = 21.55), χ2 (1) 
= 10.56, p = .001. 
Asymmetric Games Only 
Full Sample 
 Cooperation rate. Cooperation rate in the asymmetric games was examined by testing for 
an interaction between the type of asymmetric game and the player’s relative position (see Table 
10 for the cooperation rates by condition).  Besides the interaction, the main effects of 
asymmetry and position were also included in the model, along with the blocking variables 
school and sex, the covariate age, and the factor the number of negative payoffs (and its 
interactions with the other factors).  The asymmetry by position interaction was significant, χ2 
(1)= 3.99, p = .05, with the odds for cooperating  in RowPositive versus RowNegative games 
being 1.6 times larger when playing in the High position than when playing in the Low position 
(p = .04).  In other words, participants cooperated significantly more often in the RowPositve 
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games, but only when they were in the higher relative position (see Figure 7).  Position was also 
significant, χ2 (1) = 11.65, p = .0006, but its effect is explained by the interaction.  As usual the 
effect of school was significant, χ2 (1) = 23.05, p = .0006, with UIUC students 2.44 times more 
likely to cooperate than NWU students.   
 Decision time.  Sex was significant, χ2 (1) = 6.89, p = .009, with males taking longer to 
respond than females (M = 18.87 vs. 15.84 sec.)  Asymmetry was significant, χ2 (1) = 22.67, p < 
.0001, with participants taking longer to respond in RowNegative games than in RowPositive 
games (M = 18.36 vs. 16.35 sec.) 
SVO added as a within-subjects factor 
 Cooperation rate. The analysis for only asymmetric games was repeated with SVO 
included as a factor and its reliability as a covariate (N = 120).  Table 11 contains the score χ2 
tests of the model effects on cooperation rates in the asymmetric games.  The 3-way interaction 
between asymmetry, position, and SVO (see Table 12 for cooperation rates by condition), was 
not significant at p < .05, with χ2 (2) = 5.49, p = .06.  In RowPositve games, the odds for 
cooperating when playing in the High position compared to when playing in the Low position 
were 7.52 times larger for those with a cooperative SVO than those with an individualist SVO 
(see Figure 8).  The 2-way interaction between asymmetry and SVO was significant, χ2 (2) = 
7.33, p = .03, with the odds for cooperating in the RowPositve games compared to the 
RowNegative games being 7.37 times larger for those with an individualist SVO than those with 
a cooperative SVO.   The 3-way interaction between, negative payoffs, position and SVO (see 
Table 13 and Figure 9) was significant, χ2 (8) = 17.35, p = .03, but none of the odds contrasts 
were. 
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 Decision time.  Only Asymmetry was significant, with χ2 (1) = 8.45, p < .004, with 
participants taking longer to respond in RowNegative games than in RowPositive games (M = 
17.81 vs. 15.96 sec.) 
Persistent Cooperators and Defectors excluded 
 Cooperation rate. Removing persistent defectors eliminated the school effect (χ2 = 2.87, p 
= .09) and strengthened the odds in the asymmetry by position interaction to 1.77. 
 Decision time.  Sex was significant, χ2 (1) = 5.00, p = .03, with males taking longer to 
respond than females (M = 19.61 vs. 16.32 sec.)  Asymmetry was significant, χ2 (1) = 13.96, p < 
.0002, with participants taking longer to respond in RowNegative games than in RowPositive 
games (M = 18.98 vs. 16.96 sec.) 
SVO Added and Persistent Cooperators/Defectors Excluded 
 Cooperation rate. The 3-way interaction between, negative payoffs, position and SVO 
remained significant, χ2 (8) = 17.65, p = .02.  Instead of a 3-way interaction between asymmetry, 
position, and SVO (χ2 (2) = 4.38, p = .11), there was now a 2-way interaction between 
asymmetry and SVO (χ2 (2) = 8.40 p = .02) and a main effect for position (χ2 (1) = 6.21 p = .01). 
 Decision time.  Nothing predicted decision time at p < .05.  
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Discussion 
 Factors affecting cooperation are rarely studied in the context of the 1-shot PD game.  
Many real-world interactions, however, are 1-time events, so it is important to determine how 
well factors studied in iterated games apply to the 1-shot PD. In the present within-subject study 
we systematically examine the interaction between 4 factors on cooperation in the PD that have 
only been studied haphazardly in the literature: symmetry, the number of negative (column) 
payoffs, the player’s relative position in asymmetric games, and SVO.   
 When asymmetry has been investigated in the literature (always in iterated games), 
experiments have lacked symmetric benchmarks, have used too few observations, or have 
involved pre-programmed strategies.  Moreover, studies have usually been limited to 
investigating a single form of asymmetry, whereas asymmetry can take many forms.  
 When studying the sign of the payoff (usually in the context of a gain-loss frame), 
previous research has often been limited to comparing games with all positive and games with all 
negative payoffs or, occasionally, comparing games with positive payoffs to those with 2 
negative payoffs.  We are unaware of studies including 1 or 3 negative payoffs. 
 While players’ relative position has been studied in asymmetric games, we study it more 
thoroughly by distinguishing between two types of asymmetric games: RowPositive games 
where the row player always receives the highest payoffs available (all are positive) and 
RowNegative games where the row player always receives the lowest payoffs available (all are 
negative). With row position payoffs held constant in one of those two ways, column position 
payoffs are free to vary, creating eight different asymmetric games. 
 We are unaware of research where SVO was studied with asymmetric games, so it was 
included in our experiment as a potential predictor of cooperation. 
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 Across all conditions in our grand experiment we found an interaction between symmetry 
and position, with cooperation rates lower in asymmetric games due to increased defection 
among players in the Low position.  This is consistent with Sheposh and Gallo’s (1973) findings.  
We also found a main effect for symmetry, with subjects cooperating significantly more often 
when playing RowPositive games than when either playing Symmetric or RowNegative games.  
This leads to another interpretation of the interactions, with players cooperating significantly 
more often when playing in the High position of the RowPositive games than in any of the other 
games.  This is not necessarily inconsistent with Sheposh and Gallo’s findings – they only use 
one type of asymmetry and the closest game they have to a RowPositive matrix is one in which 
both players share a 0 for the S payoff, preventing complete dominance by the High player.  
A main effect was found for the convenience sample, with those at NWU (business 
majors) cooperating significantly less often than those at UIUC (psychology majors).  This effect 
disappeared when the analysis was rerun without persistent defectors (those who defected on all 
13 games) since the NWU sample had more persistent defectors than the UIUC sample.  Neither 
the number of negative payoffs, SVO nor their interactions with any other factors was useful in 
predicting cooperation.  The blocking variable sex and the covariate age did not contribute much 
to the models either.   
 Given difficulties arising from the unbalanced experimental design, it was helpful to 
analyze the symmetric games and the asymmetric games separately. 
 For the symmetric games there was a main effect of the number of negative payoffs, but 
no effect for SVO, nor an interaction between number of negative payoffs and SVO.  The 
negative payoff effect was exclusively driven by subjects cooperating less often when playing 
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with 3 negative payoffs (M = .22, SE = .02). Nevertheless, while significant, the difference in 
cooperation rate was not particularly large, with the most cooperation occurring when playing 
with 0 negative payoffs (M = .30, SE = .03).   
Our findings are in stark contrast to those of Experiment 1 of de Dreu and McCusker 
(1997) which examined cooperation as a function of SVO and Frame (gain or loss, equivalent to 
0 or 4 negative payoffs) in symmetric games and found an interaction between SVO and frame, a 
main effect for SVO and no main effect for frame.  Reanalyzing our data with just two levels of 
negative payoffs, we find neither an interaction nor any main effects.  Moreover, whereas they 
found individualists cooperate more with a gain frame than a loss frame (.39 vs. .14) and 
cooperatives cooperate less with gain frame than a loss frame (.53 vs. .75), we found the opposite 
(but non-significant) pattern: Individualist .23 vs. .27 (SE = .06); Cooperative .41 vs. .38. (SE = 
.08).   
We do not have a specific explanation for this discrepancy with de Dreu and McCusker, 
but will note some possibilities: 1) They use a much cruder assessment of SVO, Kuhlman and 
Marshello’s (1975) “triple dominance games” in which subjects are presented a game with three 
self-other outcome options, each corresponding to the cooperative, competitive, or individualist 
SVO (the less common SVOs are not available).  Subjects are classified as the SVO 
corresponding to the option they endorse for least 6 of the 9 games (7 of their 81 initial subjects 
were dropped for failing to meet this criterion). 2) They note that a large (but undeclared) portion 
of their subjects were drawn from medical students (possibly explaining the unusually large 
number of competitive SVOs in their sample) with the others drawn from the social sciences / 
humanities, but they fail to include this discipline factor in their analyses. 3) Their study involves 
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a specific manipulation of the frame: In the gain frame, subjects begin with 0 points and can gain 
points by making decisions; in the loss frame, subjects start with 22 points and can lose points 
(up to the 22) by making decisions.  By contrast, the current study used a more sensitive measure 
of SVO, Liebrand’s (1988) RING, included a proxy of discipline as a blocking variable, a 
reliability variable as a covariate, and did not make use of a frame when distinguishing between 
positive and negative payoffs.      
 By conducting further analyses focused solely on the asymmetric games, we were better 
able to disentangle the interaction between Asymmetry, Position, and SVO.  Much like in the 
analysis across all games, we found an asymmetry by position interaction driven primarily by 
greater cooperation when subjects played RowPositive games in the High position (M = .31 vs. 
overall M = .24) and we found a main effect of position, with subjects cooperating more often in 
the High position than in the Low position (M = .27 vs. .20).  These differences in cooperation 
rate increased in magnitude when SVO was added to the asymmetry by position interaction: 
While the overall cooperate rate in the RowPositve & High position condition was .33, it was .45 
for cooperatives, .34 for individualists, and .23 for competitors.  
  Overall, both the number of negative payoffs and sex did predict decision times, with 
males taking longer than women (M = 15.54 vs. 18.98 secs.) and a mostly linear increase in 
decision times as the number of negative payoffs increased (M = 15.95 to 18.60 secs).  These 
differences tended to erode with greater partitioning of the games and subjects and we are 
uncertain of their utility.      
Caveats 
 Our subjects played 13 PD games in which they were randomly assigned as a Row or 
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Column position player in the symmetric games and as a High or Low position player in the 
asymmetric; this yielded an unbalanced repeated measures design, with subjects only playing 13 
of the 26 possible position configurations.  Standard ANOVA and GLM procedures cannot 
handle unbalanced repeated measures designs, so instead we employed Generalized Linear 
Models with GEE (SAS’s Proc GenMod)3, a procedure not normally found in the PD literature.  
Similarly, the within–subject design, large number of factors investigated and 1-shot nature of 
the games led to the analyses being conducted in terms of odds of cooperating, i.e., logistic 
regression, rather than testing for differences in mean cooperation rates.  We consider logistic 
regression an excellent way to study manipulations in (1-shot) PD games, but again it is not how 
iterated PD games are usually studied.4  Finally, our SVO measures were only added in media 
res, leading to some complicated sample sub-setting (see Table 4) and additional analyses5. 
Conclusions 
 We study the effects and interactions of four factors (symmetry, the number of negative 
(column) payoffs, the player’s relative position, and SVO) far more systematically than they 
have preciously been studied in the PD literature.  We also study many of these factors for the 
first time in 1-shot PD games and offer useful suggestions on the means by which 1-shot games 
may be analyzed.   
 
3 HLM procedures could have been used instead, but SAS 9.1’s Proc GenMod was used for reasons of software 
availability and ease of use: SPSS 17’s HLM procedure (Proc Mixed) cannot accommodate non-linear models; 
HLM6’s free student version could not accommodate the number of variables needed per level; SAS 9.1’s non-
linear model HLM procedure (Proc NLMixed) was difficult to use and its successor (Proc Glimmix) was not fully 
functional until SAS 9.2.  
4 Before settling on GenMod with binary outcome variables, we attempted to analyses our data via the McNemar, a 
non-parametric test of correlated proportions, but then the results would have had to have been discussed via 
differences in games, rather than main effects and interactions of the factors manipulated. 
5 The number of subjects (N = 120) used for the second wave of data collection followed from a power calculation 
based on results from McNemar tests on the the first wave of data (N = 174).  
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Figure 1. Matrix payoffs for the four possible outcomes of a trial and the relation between 
payoffs.  The right-justified value above the diagonal in each cell is Participant A’s payoff.  The 
matrix values are subject to the following conditions: (a) 2R > T+S > 2P; (b) T > R; (c) T > S; 
(d) P > S.  
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Figure 2. Matrix payoffs for an asymmetric game where each of Participant B’s four 
possible outcomes (left justified) are always x increments lower than the same outcomes for 
Participant A.   
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Figure 3.  Own/Other outcome plane and four classes of social values orientations. Adapted from 
Liebrand and McClintock (1988). 
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Figure 4.  Cumulative distribution of cooperative decisions for symmetric, asymmetric and all 
games.
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Figure 5.  Cooperation Rate (± SE) in symmetric games across negative payoffs. 
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Figure 6. Cooperation Rate (± SE) in symmetric games for each SVO across negative payoffs.  
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Figure 7. Cooperation Rate (± SE) for High and Low Position in Asymmetric Conditions 
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Figure 8.  Cooperation rate (± SE) in asymmetric games for players in high and low position by 
SVO 
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Figure 9. Cooperation rate (± SE) in asymmetric games as a function of the negative payoffs, for 
players in high and low position by SVO
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Table 3
SVO Distribution by School
SVO NW UIUC Total
Competitive 5 14 19
Individualist 36 28 64
Cooperative 19 18 37
Total 60 60 120
School
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Table 4
Significance of Cooperation Rate and Decision Time Across all Subsets and Subsamples
Factor Full SVO NoPersistent SVO & NoPersistent Full SVO NoPersistent SVO & NoPersistent
School S S N N N N N N
Sex N N N N S S S N
Age N N N N N N N N
Symmetry (S) S S S S S S S N
Position (P) S S S S S S S N
Negative Payoffs (N) N N N N S S S S
SVO - N - N - N - N
S x P S S S S S S S N
S x N N N N N N N N N
S x SVO - N - N - N - N
P x N N N N N N N N N
P x SVO - N - N - N - N
N x SVO - N - N - N - N
S x P x N N N N N N N N N
S x P x SVO - N - N - N - N
S x N x SVO - N - N - N - N
P x N x SVO - N - N - N - N
S x P x N x SVO - N - N - N - N
School S S N N N N N N
Sex S N N N S N N N
Age N N N N N N N N
Symmetry (S) - - - - - N - N
Position (P) - - - - - N - N
Negative Payoffs (N) S N S N S S S S
SVO - N - N - N - S
S x P - - - - - - - -
S x N - - - - - - - -
S x SVO - - - - - - - -
P x N - - - - - - - -
P x SVO - - - - - - - -
N x SVO - N - N - N - N
S x P x N - - - - - - - -
S x P x SVO - - - - - - - -
S x N x SVO - - - - - - - -
P x N x SVO - - - - - - - -
S x P x N x SVO - - - - - - - -
School S S N N N N N N
Sex N N N N S N N N
Age N N N N N N N N
Symmetry (S) N N N N S S N N
Position (P) S S S S N N S N
Negative Payoffs (N) N N N N N N N N
SVO - N - N - N - N
S x P S N S N N N S N
S x N N N N N N N N N
S x SVO - S - S - N - N
P x N N N N N N N N N
P x SVO - N - N - N - N
N x SVO - N - N - N - N
S x P x N N N N N N N N N
S x P x SVO - N - N - N - N
S x N x SVO - N - N - N - N
P x N x SVO - N - S - N - N
S x P x N x SVO - N - N - N - N
Note . S = Significant at p  < .05, N = Non-significant, - = Non-applicable
Full: All subjects (N  = 294);  
SVO: only subjects with measured SVO (N  = 120);
NoPersistent: only subjects who did not defect (or cooperate) across all 13 games (N = 194);
SVO & NoPersistent: only subjects with measured SVO who did not defect (or cooperate) across all 13 games (N = 83).
Asymmetric Games
Decision TimeCooperation Rate
All Games
Symmetric Games
 
 44 
 
Table 5
Tests of Model Effects on Cooperation
Source Score χ 2 df p
School 17.25 1 .00
Sex 2.18 1 .14
Age .01 1 .91
Negative Payoffs 5.91 4 .21
Symmetry x Position 14.70 4 .00
Between subjects
Within subjects
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Table 6
Parameter Estimates and Cooperation Odds
Parameter Estimate SE Z p Odds
Intercept -1.06 .83 -2.70 .57 -1.27 .20 .35 .07 1.77
School NW -.78 .19 -1.14 -.41 -4.15 .00 .46 .32 .66
UIUC 0
Sex Male .28 .18 -.08 .63 1.51 .13 1.32 .92 1.88
Female 0
Age .00 .04 -.08 .07 -.11 .91 1.00 .92 1.08
Negative Payoffs 0 .02 .11 -.20 .24 .18 .86 1.02 .82 1.27
1 -.04 .11 -.24 .17 -.34 .73 .96 .78 1.19
2 -.03 .11 -.24 .19 -.23 .81 .97 .79 1.21
3 -.19 .11 -.41 .02 -1.79 .07 .82 .67 1.02
4 0
Symmetry x Position Symmetric & Neutral .41 .12 .18 .64 3.45 .00 1.51 1.19 1.90
RowPositive & High .67 .15 .37 .96 4.44 .00 1.95 1.45 2.62
RowPositive & Low .08 .15 -.22 .37 .51 .61 1.08 .81 1.45
RowNegative & High .30 .15 .01 .60 2.02 .04 1.35 1.01 1.81
RowNegative & Low 0
95% CI 95% CI  for Odds
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Table 7
Tests of Model Effects on Decision Time
Source Score χ 2 df p
School 3.31 1 .07
Sex 8.53 1 .00
Age 1.63 1 .20
Negative Payoffs 31.97 4 .00
Symmetry x Position 33.47 4 .00
Between subjects
Within subjects
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Table 8
Parameter Estimates and Mean Decision Times
Parameter Estimate SE Z p Means SE
Intercept 24.83 3.98 17.03 32.63 6.24 <.0001
School NW -1.86 1.01 -3.84 0.11 -1.85 .06 16.33 .73
UIUC 0 18.19 .78
Sex Male 3.43 1.15 1.18 5.68 2.99 .00 18.98 .99
Female 0 15.54 .56
Age -0.25 0.19 -0.62 0.11 -1.36 .17
Negative Payoffs 0 -2.65 0.60 -3.82 -1.48 -4.44 <.0001 15.95 .63
1 -2.46 0.55 -3.54 -1.38 -4.47 <.0001 16.14 .55
2 -0.92 0.50 -1.90 0.06 -1.84 .07 17.68 .65
3 -0.66 0.57 -1.77 0.46 -1.16 .25 17.94 .63
4 0 18.60 .75
Symmetry x Position Symmetric & Neutral -2.40 0.51 -3.41 -1.40 -4.68 <.0001 16.75 .61
RowPositive & High -2.75 0.56 -3.85 -1.66 -4.93 <.0001 16.40 .58
RowPositive & Low -3.13 0.57 -4.24 -2.02 -5.52 <.0001 16.02 .60
RowNegative & High -1.17 0.60 -2.34 0.00 -1.96 .05 17.98 .72
RowNegative & Low 0 19.15 .72
95% CI
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Table 9
Cooperation Rate in Symmetric Games by Negative Payoffs and SVO
Negative Payoffs Competitive Individualist Cooperative Overall
0 .21 .23 .41 .28
1 .32 .23 .35 .28
2 .16 .28 .43 .31
3 .21 .16 .41 .24
4 .26 .27 .38 .30
Overall .23 .23 .39 .28
SVO
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Table 10
Cooperation Rate for High and Low Position in Asymmetric Conditions
Asymmetry High Low Overall
RowPositive .31 .21 .26
RowNegative .24 .19 .22
Overall .27 .20 .24
Relative Position
 
 
 
 50 
 
Table 11
Asymmetric Games: Tests of Model Effects on Cooperation
Source Score χ 2 df p
School 11.85 1 .00
Sex 0.68 1 .41
Age 0.10 1 .75
SVO 0.71 2 .70
SVO Reliability 5.27 1 .02
Asymmetry (A) 0.77 1 .38
Negative Payoffs (N) 3.52 4 .47
Position (P) 5.95 1 .01
A x P 1.15 1 .28
N x P 1.08 4 .90
P x SVO 4.39 2 .11
A x SVO 7.33 2 .03
N x SVO 7.77 8 .46
A x P x SVO 5.49 2 .06
N x P x SVO 17.35 8 .03
Between subjects
Within subjects
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Table 12
Cooperation Rate in Asymmetric Conditions by Position and SVO
SVO Player Position RowPositive RowNegative Overall
Competitive High .23 .20 .21
Low .20 .35 .27
Individualist High .29 .22 .25
Low .19 .13 .17
Cooperative High .45 .34 .39
Low .13 .20 .16
Overall .24 .22 .23
Asymmetry
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Table 13
Cooperation Rate in Asymmetric Games across Negative Payoffs, Position and SVO
Player Position Negative Payoffs Competitive Individualist Cooperative Overall
High 0 .23 .14 .39 .23
1 .21 .39 .39 .35
2 .21 .22 .39 .27
3 .22 .25 .35 .28
4 .18 .17 .50 .26
Low 0 .33 .29 .11 .23
1 .21 .14 .28 .19
2 .35 .15 .09 .17
3 .20 .17 .24 .19
4 .25 .12 .05 .11
Overall .24 .21 .27 .23
SVO
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Appendix A 
 The 13 games can be subdivided into 3 categories, each with five matrices (2 matrices 
overlap conditions): Symmetric, Asymmetric: RowPositive, and Asymmetric: RowNegative. 
Symmetric. Row and Column payoffs are all positive (4+/0-) initially, and both are reduced in 40 
point increments, increasing the number of negative payoffs by one on every subsequent matrix. 
Asymmetric: RowPositive. Row payoffs always remain positive, but Column payoffs are reduced 
in 40 point decrements, increasing the number of negative column payoffs by one on every 
subsequent matrix.  
Asymmetric: RowNegative. Row payoffs are always negative, but Column payoffs are increased 
in 40 point increments, increasing the number of positive column payoffs by one on every 
subsequent matrix.  
 See Figure A1 for the matrices sorted by symmetry category and the number of negative 
payoffs.   In each matrix, the row player must choose between the upper (U) and lower (D) rows 
and the column player must choose between the left (L) and right (R) columns.  Within each 
quadrant, the row player’s payoffs are indicated in the lower left and the column player’s in the 
upper right.   
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Figure A1. Games sorted by symmetry and number of negative payoffs.  Note that in symmetric 
games both Row and Column payoffs are systematically reduced by 40 point increments as the 
number of negative payoffs increases; in asymmetric games only Column payoffs are reduced.  
Grayed-out games are redundant placeholders.  
